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Introduction
The prevalence of land-related political conflict in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa today is often very poorly understood. Conflict is often explained as failure of the state to penetrate the rural areas. Much discussion of land conflict conveys the impression that naturalresource disputes in Africa stem from the weakness (or absence) of state intervention in rural property relations. Yet in many cases, this is clearly not so. Some of the most extensive episodes of conflict over land and property rights, including violent conflict, have happened in farming and pastoral zones marked by long histories of deep state involvement in the ordering and reordering of rural property relations. Since the 1990s, highly politicized land conflict has played out in some of the most intensively governed regions of Africa's strongest states --some examples are the Rift Valley of Kenya, rural Rwanda, North Kivu in DRC, Zimbabwe's commercial areas, and southern Côte d'Ivoire. These cases underscore the need for more comparative and more political theories of land tenure regimes and rural conflict. Mamdani (1996) , Munro (1998) , Lentz (2013) and others have insisted that African land tenure regimes be viewed as institutional configurations that have been molded and remolded by colonial and postcolonial governments in efforts to extend state power in the rural areas. They show that existing land tenure regimes bear the heavy imprint of the modern state, even if they are often not entirely defined by states, and that rural land regimes go far in structuring the political relationships that link rural communities to the state. This paper builds upon this work by advancing two propositions. 1 The first is that African land regimes vary greatly across space, and that as a first cut, critical differences can be captured in two different models of rural land tenure, a neocustomary model and a statist model. The "neocustomary land regimes" referred to here are the land regimes in which state-backed local leaders who are officially recognized as neocustomary or traditional exercise state-sanctioned authority within communities recognized as autochthonous or indigenous by the state, including authority over land allocations and land-dispute adjudication. Under "statist land regimes," by contrast, the central state itself is the land allocator and dispute adjudicator. This analytic framework is crude and schematic: in actuality, local land regimes often mix or combine these different sorts of rules, or display other ambiguities or hybridities. Nevertheless, this schematic model of variation in land regimes captures critical differences in the forms of authority and political identities that structure smallholders' access to land.
The second proposition is that differences that are captured in this neocustomary-statist distinction can help account for patterned variations in the structure and political character of land-related competition and conflict. This paper illustrates this proposition by contrasting local responses to large scale land acquisitions in 2009-2010, in two places with land regimes that exemplify the schematic distinction between the neocustomary and the statist. The first is the Kumasi region of central Ghana, where a strong neocustomary land tenure regime structured local resistance and responses to outsiders' acquisition of 400 ha. of prime farmland for a huge infrastructural project, the "inland port" at Boankra. The second is the Kiru Valley in Babati
District of Manyara Region in northern Tanzania, where a statist land regime structured local famers' responses to the state's granting of large tracts of land to promoters of commercial sugar cane estates. Two dimensions of the land tenure regimes prove to be particularly salient in shaping the political character of the land-related conflicts examined in this paper. The first is how land regimes define the locus of authority over the allocation of land rights (local versus central state). The second has to do with how local jurisdictions are nested into national
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Differences in land tenure regimes that prove to be key in the case study analysis can be understood in terms of the basic, structural differences between neocustomary and statist land tenure institutions. Part I of the paper draws out these general distinctions contrasts. In Africa, these institutional forms were introduced by the European colonial regimes. Postcolonial governments, including Ghanaian and Tanzanian governments, have actively refined or modified inherited land institutions in response to their own political needs and logics. The typological distinction between neocustomary and statist land institutions remains as salient and analytically useful in describing postcolonial land tenure regimes, however, and postcolonial continuities in institutional form are striking in most parts of most countries. Part II presents the contrasting case studies. Changes in political-economic context over the course of the last few decades, especially rising pressure on the land and heightening tensions between commercial investors and smallholders, are fueling a new era of land politics and land-related conflict. These new pressures are mediated through very different land tenure regimes --that is, different relations of authority, identity, and territory --in our two cases. The analysis shows that institutional variations give rise to very different kinds of land politics. A conclusion draws some larger implications for thinking about institutionalized political authority in Africa, and how it shapes the scale and character of politics.
I. Land Regimes and State-Building: Two Models
Today's land tenure regimes have been shaped decisively by the efforts of rulers, both colonial and postcolonial, to project authority over territory and to govern rural populations.
Colonial rulers designed land institutions that defined administrative and political jurisdictions at the lowest levels of state apparatus. Authority-based controls over land were codified and institutionalized to define local relations of authority and property, and to shape politically-salient local identities. Independent governments in Africa have also exploited the ways in which authority over land can be deployed to gather power over people, and to structure and incentivize their political behavior.
Colonial rulers states claimed ownership or trusteeship of all land in the African territories. Where they wanted to use and exploit land directly (for urban development, government installations, mining, and the settlement of European farmers or ranchers), colonial authorities usually expropriated African landholders and users. In these places, farmers or pastoralists were forcibly expelled from their ancestral areas or from lands they claimed by other rights. Colonial states proceeded to allocate land access to users directly, either arbitrarily or under statute, institutionalizing the statist land tenure regimes.
Across most of Africa, however, colonial rulers did not seek to assert direct political control over the land. Rather, they sought to craft land tenure institutions that would further their basic political objectives of keeping most of the population in the rural areas; limiting mobility by fixing populations in territories designated as ethnic homelands; and solidifying structures of political control that would ward off revolt, uprisings, and rebellion. To these ends, colonizers sought to take advantage of and accentuate mechanisms of social control that existed (or were presumed to exist) in "African tribal society." Institutionalizing the neocustomary land tenure regimes was the main instrument for doing this.
The neocustomary land tenure regimes were less costly to erect and enforce than the more intrusive and overtly coercive statist land regimes. After the Second World War, the indirect-rule logic embodied in the neocustomary land regimes was colonizers' preferred institutional choice across almost all sub-Saharan Africa-that is, wherever countervailing considerations did not create rationales for imposing the more costly (in terms of administration and coercion) statist land regimes. Their successors, the postcolonial governments, have modified these institutional configurations, but their efforts and initiatives have been guided by similar state-building logics and constraints. Continuities in actual institutional form are striking in most places.
A. The Neocustomary Land Regimes
In most of colonial sub-Saharan Africa, colonial authorities' interest in land tenure flowed largely from their interest in establishing and enforcing authority over rural people. 3 Rules of land access were set to establish hierarchical relationships between collaborating African elites and their subjects. Although "some of the organizing concepts of precolonial land tenure systems continued to influence evolving patterns of land control" (Berry 1988, 58) , state-recognized chiefs and the male elders or lineage heads who were often designated as their advisers were given wide powers to make up what colonialism recognized as customary land tenure. They used these prerogatives to extend their authority (and their landholdings).
Land powers gave the local authorities recognized by the colonial state carrots and sticks that they used to govern their rural subjects. Neocustomary rulers had the power to allocate unoccupied land; seize and reallocate land deemed not in use; cede land to the central government or at its behest; seize land they deemed needed for communal purposes; seize the land of people who did not pay taxes, fines, meet the corvée, or submit to conscription; force widows and divorced women to turn over land to their in-laws; force younger men to submit to the discretion of elders in deciding land disposition and use; dispose of inheritance cases; rule on other land disputes within and among families; authorize transactions or sanction individuals for land transactions (such as rentals) not deemed to conform to customary practice as defined by the chief and elders; and enforce colonial land-use policies (such as forced terracing or destocking). These prerogatives were supplemented by powers to tax, conscript, arrest, jail, and mete out justice (short of the death penalty). Colonialism's political and economic institutions thus worked at the microlevel to impose and enforce the hierarchy of those who had administrative powers over the land, over those who worked the land or needed access to it.
With the help of anthropologists, colonial authorities undertook to draw jurisdictions that confirmed or expanded the geographic sphere of influence of some (trusted) customary authorities and reduced or eliminated the domains of other (often distrusted) local leaders. These new jurisdictions were supposed to be tribal territories encompassing the ancestral homelands of the people (grouped into a tribe) who were subject to the authority of the customary (tribal) ruler.
When reality did not fit the administrative map, reality was often adjusted. Official tribal homelands constituted the geographical/territorial arenas for the exercise of customary rulership, and the operation of customary courts, land tenure regimes, and citizenship regimes. 4 These internal boundaries partitioned space, authority, population subgroups, and land. These jurisdictions and chiefly hierarchies constituted the basic administrative units and administrative machinery (the "local states") of rural Africa under colonial rule.
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Neocustomary land regimes were founded on the principle that land encompassed within an officially-recognized ethnic homeland was the endowment of a descent-based community.
Chiefs or other customary leaders were supposed to manage this corporate endowment on behalf of the group. Membership in the descent-based group was thus understood to confer a land entitlement. Land access rules thus imposed a distinction between those who had a land entitlement within the ethnic homeland, and those who did not. Insider-outsider distinctions became particularly salient where cash-crop production developed in zones of low population density --that is, where in-migrants provided much of the labor to expand the cash-crop economy. Outsiders or ethnic strangers could gain provisional access to it with the permission of certain community members, contingent on acceptance of their politically subordinate status within the community (and usually some kind of payment to the rightful landholder). As Painter and Philo (1995, 107) put it, customary authority created or reinforced "political system[s] of inclusion and exclusion" by stipulating who was considered a full citizen in the customary jurisdiction (with political rights and economic rights of membership) and who was not.
The integrity of neocustomary land tenure regimes as systems for enforcing hierarchical authority and the cohesion of descent-based groups rested in large part on the principle of nonalienability of land. This is why colonial administrations sought to suppress land sales within the chiefly jurisdictions. 6 They realized that the development of land markets would undermine chiefs' authority over land and over community members. The rulers also saw that the development of land markets would dissolve the hierarchically-structured descent groups, headed by male elders, that they sought to reinforce as the basic landholding unit and the basic political unit (Goody 1980, 152) .
African interests also coalesced around the neocustomary land tenure regimes. In rural localities, chiefs and members of dominant lineages had a long-term interest in defending their political prerogatives over land, even if they also often had short-term interests in strategic sales that would generate revenue. At the grassroots level, many smallholders and subordinate members of corporate landholding groups developed vested interests in the principle that access to land in their ethnic homeland was a birthright recognized (if not always honored) by the state (Chanock 1998, 235) . Within extended families and households, the neocustomary structures gave senior males authority over land farmed by women and youth, as well as claims to the labor of these subordinate household members. adjudicating land-related disputes arising over boundaries, inheritance, and transactions. These same community-level authorities also often retained the prerogative in allocating access to shared resources such as community forests, water points, and pasture. The notion of customary rights also remained politically entrenched in most of rural Africa, where it is wielded for diverse purposes by the multiple actors-at all levels of state and society-who have a stake in the political prerogatives, protections, and promises it can provide.
B. The Statist Land Tenure Regimes
Within some geographically delimited jurisdictions in every African colony, the state made itself the direct allocator, enforcer, and manager of rural land rights. This is most striking in the white settler colonies of Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, and Mozambique, where colonial states alienated vast domains from African land users, created separate administrative and political institutions to govern these spaces, and assigned rights to arable and pasturable land to European settlers or foreign companies for the creation of commercial farms, plantations, and ranches. In some strategic areas of smallholder farming, postcolonial African governments also assumed direct authority over land allocation, the management of land use, and land-rights adjudication. pasturelands that had expropriated by the state. Governments have also asserted direct control over land for the creation of cities, public works projects, transportation infrastructure, airports, ports, agricultural research centers and demonstration farms, military camps, and landed estates that can be given to political elites. They have cordoned off forest reserves, national parks, and game preserves, which become off-limits to farmers and, often, most pastoralists as well.
In such areas, land authority is not devolved to state-recognized customary authorities.
The central state itself is a direct allocator and manager of land access and use. We refer to this type of land control regime as "statist" to underscore the directness of the state's role in allocating land and, thus, to distinguish this mode of land governance from the indirect rule arrangements that define the so-called customary land tenure regimes in Africa.
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Under colonialism, forcible displacement of settled farming communities or longestablished pastoralists was a basic tool in the state's repertoire of techniques of territorial, resource, and political control. As Sara Berry has said, "Colonial officials resorted, time and time again, to moving people from one location and settling them in another. . . . Displacement was commonplace" (Berry 2002, 641 State-sponsored movements of agrarian colonization were promoted to relieve population pressure in high-density areas, control disease, increase agricultural production, assert political control over rural populations through creation of settled farming communities (the creation of peasantries), or clear the way for dams and reservoirs. Both colonial and postcolonial governments encouraged and facilitated the settlement of migrants onto "state controlled agrarian frontiers," 10 or "new lands" opened up to smallholder farming by the development of irrigation, swamp reclamation, tsetse fly eradication, the drilling of boreholes to create permanent sources of water, expulsion of pastoralists, or the abandonment of properties by white settlers.
Cases in point can be found in discrete subnational territories in virtually all countries of Africa --pockets or zones of statist land tenure exist in countries in which neocustomary tenure prevails throughout most of the national territory. Tanzania stands out as a country in which postcolonial rulers have deliberately dismantled neocustomary land tenure institutions throughout virtually all of the national space. The state-led uprooting and resettlement of over half of the rural population under the Ujamaa policies in the 1970s was a decisive phase in this process.
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In these situations, it is the state that regulates land access and land rights. Statist land tenure regimes create structures and relationships of political control over farmers that differ greatly from those prevailing under the (neo)customary land tenure regimes.
Terms of land access draw them into direct relation to the state, rather than one that is mediated by neocustomary authorities or the collectivities they are supposed to represent, as is the case in the neocustomary land regimes. Under these conditions, membership in an ethnic group may well have no salience in the land-tenure relationship. In-migrants are beholden to the central state for land access, rather than to a customary chief, local landlord, or other indigenous host. The relation of on-going dependency upon or exposure to state actions finds legal expression in the fact that farmers on smallholder settlement schemes have rarely received negotiable titles to their land. Land disputes and adjudication are mediated through the administrative and political organs of state, rather than through neocustomary institutions. The statist land tenure regimes work to 11 Boone and Nyeme (in press). 12 Shack and Skinner 1978, 5. define the land-user a subject (and potentially a citizen, in the best circumstances) of the state, rather than a member of an ethnic collectivity.
Just as the customary land regimes have had their stakeholders and defenders among land allocators and users, so too have the statist land regimes. Farmers whose land rights have been granted directly by state authorities, without appeal to the customary land regimes, have a vested stake in the central government's authority to allocate land, and in the national principle that citizens have a right to settle and farm anywhere in the country.
C. Destabilizating the postcolonial land tenure regimes
Postcolonial governments in Africa have crafted land tenure regimes that give political authorities --be they of the neocustomary or statist type --a direct role in mediating land access and land dispute adjudication for smallholder farmers. These institutional configurations serve as the basic political infrastructure by which rural Africa is governed. Both the neocustomary and statist land regimes can embody a kind of social contract that ties land users to political authorities, that defines communities and their relations to the state, and that confers entitlements or claims (however provisional, fragile, or inconsistently honored these may prove to be) on land users (Boone 2007) . This helps to explain the levels of political and social stability of these arrangements achieved in most places for most of the postcolonial period.
Over the last generation or so, however, it has become increasing obvious to outside observers that sub-Saharan Africa's smallholder land tenure regime are coming under intensifying stress as demographic, political, environmental, and economic conditions are changing. This is especially clear in in the post-1990 period, when several difference sources of pressure on the land have coalesced to produce land scarcity for smallholders. Closing of the land frontier, rising land values, rising populations, environmental change, and the changing structure of agricultural commodity markets have all worked to destabilize social and political relationships around land that were institutionalized in earlier eras. In some places, structural adjustment policies and the return to multipartism have also had destabilizing effects. Donor-endorsed or -supported land law reform processes now underway in many countries are intended to overwrite the pre-existing arrangements, in order to commodify land, free it from social and political encumbrances and controls, and invest authority over land-transfer in users and thus remove this prerogative from neocustomary authorities and/or the state.
The commercial and large-scale land acquisitions that have received a great deal of attention since 2008 must be understood against this wider backdrop. 13 They are moves toward more complete commodification of relations of both land tenure and production. By definition, these deals transfer control over large tracts of land to commercial commercial operators, almost always "outsiders" in some sense. Such land acquisitions may uproot, dispossess, and displace farmers, trample upon users' political and historical rights to the land, dissolve community ties, and undermine established, land-based political and social hierarchies.
Much of the scholarly analysis of "large scale land grabs" has focused on the exclusion of smallholders from participation in deal-making, and on the legal, political, and economic forces that conspire to severely constrain peasant farmers' and (agro-)pastoralists' abilities to defend acquired rights when their lands and pastures are targeted by large-scale, often foreign, investors.
Yet the commercial land deals that can deprive small-scale land users of access to and control over family lands are often deals struck between domestic investors and states. 14 In these cases, the actors, intermediaries, processes, and mechanisms of deal-making are often very close to home, affording land users who are threatened with expropriation or loss of land rights with more opportunity to organize protest or even resistance --that is, opportunity in terms of time, venues for exercising "voice," and possibilities for mobilizing allies within the domestic political system.
In the two situations examined below, this was indeed the case: small-scale farmers sought to defend property entitlements or land rights against domestic investors. The case analyses aim to show that cross-case variation in the nature of the existing land tenure regimes --the Ghana case provides an example of a neocustomary land regime, while the Tanzania case is an example of a statist land regime --produced variation in the ways in which smallholder land rights were politicized, advanced, contested, and defended. In both cases, institutionalized political relationships around land defined the authority norms and figures, the political identities, and political channels for protest and resistance that were implicated in smallholder resistance to land acquisitions by large-scale commercial users. Contrasts across the two cases go far in revealing land tenure institutions' structuring effects on politics. wielded to restrain the development of land markets, thus allowing the chiefs to retain authority in the rural areas, and political leverage over their subjects.
III. Local Responses to
These arrangements remain the cornerstone of a postcolonial political and legal framework for governing southern Ghana. It has allowed chiefs to extract tribute, rents, revenue, and profits from stool lands and also to accumulate properties on their own account-sometimes in favor of and sometimes at the expense of their subjects and the communities they are supposed to represent. The ultimate vesting of land in the stools also gives chiefs political leverage over both stool citizens and in-migrants within their jurisdictions. Ever since the 1920s, much of the conflict over land rights and political authority in southern Ghana has centered on the rights and prerogatives of these chiefs. 16 National governments, with a few short-lived exceptions, have chosen to ally with chiefs and to keep land-related redistributive politics bottled up at the level of the chieftaincies. Chiefs remain pivotal in dispute adjudication when conflicts cannot be resolved within families, especially in cases of interlineage or interjurisdictional disputes.
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In the customary land tenure system that the Ghanaian government has institutionalized in Ashanti region, family and lineage land rights are usufruct rights for farming. These rights are secure from confiscation by the stool as long as the land is dedicated to this use. Lineage rights are not exactly freehold rights in this land tenure regime, however: the usufruct is "superimposed" on the a stool's ultimate ownership of the land (allodial title), which is recognized in the Ghanaian constitution. Stools retain direct control over all land transactions involving outsiders (noncitizens of the stool), and non-agricultural use of lands to which the stool holds allodial title. 16 A World Bank report from the early 2000s estimated that more 80 percent of Ghana's total land area is held under some form of customary authority. 17 Crook (2008,131-2) Chiefs retain power to allocate unused land, and to authorize commercial land leases is vested in chiefs. They also retain power to reclaim land from lineages under certain conditions. In periurban zones such as the region around Kumasi that is the focus of the present analysis, this has emerged as a focal point of land conflict between chiefs and citizens of the stools in periurban zones.
Conversion of farmland to urban uses involves the termination of family and usufruct land rights. It is a process that creates clear winners and losers. Hamidu Ibrahim
Baryeh, a Kumasi Lands Commissioner, did not mince words: "The current situation is a free for all affair and the winners are the most powerful in society such as chiefs, government officials, and rich men. The losers are the youth, women folk, and the disabled; thereby sowing the seeds of instability in the future" (Baryeh 1997, 23 18 Baryeh 1997,14-15. 19 "At Atasamanso it is estimated that 700 people have no place to farm and neither do they possess building plots. At Kyerekrom it was estimated that 90% of the adult population were landless... 100% due to the urban conversion process." Baryeh 1997, 22 .
ii. Reclaiming farmland in periurban Kumasi. These processes give rise to land-related conflicts that find expression in ways that are largely structured by the prevailing land tenure regime. Land-related conflict plays out in the local political arena defined by chieftaincy, is often communitywide in scope, and targets the chieftaincy itself. Chieftaincy creates a "public sphere" where contestation over loss of land rights can take the form of voice. At issue are the scope and limits of chiefly prerogative over land. Do chiefs monopolize the power to decide to convert farmland to urban use? Do chiefs monopolize the right to allocate parcels designated for potential urban use, and to sell leases to converted land? Do they control unilaterally the disposition of revenues so generated, even to the point of simply pocketing the funds?
Open contestation over the chiefs' land powers takes place both within and outside channels institutionalized in the local state that is represented by the stool. Protest 20 Contestation over the scope of chiefly prerogative in matters concerning timber and mining concessions, which pay royalties to the stools, is also prominent. Berry 2001. 21 Interview, Ejusu-Juaben Assemblyman, 21 July 2009. Sara Berry explains that if the stool asserts eminent domain, the family "has a right to expect compensation" (Berry 2001, 179 Ubink (2007:6, 13-14) argues 24 Ubink mentions that some village Unit Committees have threatened the chiefs with destoolment (Ubink 2008, 159) . Some Unit Committees have pushed for the creation of Land Allocation Committees or tried to mediate conflicts between chiefs and particular families (as in Boankra, for example, field notes July 2009). These are instances of citizens taking advantage of the grassroots-level emanations of national representative institutions to try to impose some accountability on chiefs and democratize decision-making. 25 Author's interviews, Besease/Ejusu, 17 July 2009.
explicitly that no Ghanaian political party in the current period has attempted to take up the issue of land rights, land law reform, or abuse of chiefly authority. According to her, the entire Ghanaian central administration adheres to a "policy of non-interference" in chiefly affairs, in an attempt to stay on the good side of those who broker land and votes at the local level.
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In peri-urban Kumasi, struggles over the land-related prerogatives of chieftaincy are very difficult to "export" to these other institutional forums. Partly this is due to the narrow political (electoral) incentives of the ruling elite, but it is also the result of a national legal system which defends "customary law" as a semi-autonomous realm in which the secular courts and legislature exercise limited powers of lawmaking and legal interpretation. As Amanor explained it, "while the peasantry is also theoretically 27 They also dilute the political salience of ethnicity as an axis of political competition, and as an overt political discourse for justifying land claims. See Boone and Nyeme (in press) . 28 "The right of occupany was undoubtedly a lesser interest than English freehold, but a piece of proprietary interest in land all the same, guaranteed by statute" (Shivji, Report of the Presidential Commission, 1994, 14) . pastoralists' rights. 38 In the 1990s these were often framed in international-style discourse about protecting the rights of indigenous peoples (rather than as ethnic claims per se).
38 A number of studies that have documented the fragile nature of land rights for the perceived ethnic 'outsiders' in Tanzania, especially in the case of pastoralists and pastorialist groups who have become agro-pastoralists within the last generation or two (e.g. Maganga et al. 2007 , Walsh 2012 .
Conclusion
Studies of land politics can reveal variation across African countries in how institutionalized political authority works to constitute the scale of politics, define political identities, and to institutionalize synergies between formal and informal forms of political authority. Formal and informal power relations often layer and blend in land institutions. In the case of neocustomary land tenure institutions, has happened largely by design, as part and parcel of the general construction of colonial and postcolonial indirect rule. "Local states" constituted around neocustomary land tenure institutions have worked over time, for the most part, to both extend state authority in the countryside and to define the scale and scope of everyday politics in ways that work to consolidate ethnic political identities, and to deflect social pressures and tensions away from the central state. Where statist land tenure regimes prevail, more direct forms of rule generate different, more secular, political identities, and forms of politics that can expose the central state to direct demand-making by mobilized citizens. This paper illustrates these different processes in two situations of resistance and protest against commercial land acquisitions. In significant and observable ways, different forms of land politics in central Ghana and northern Tanzania are traceable to variation in the land tenure institutions that governments have constructed very deliberately over time.
The main thrust of this paper has been show how established, postcolonial land tenure institutions structure and mediate new challenges and conflicts. In reality, however, these new pressures and conflicts also work to redefine the institutions themselves (and the political relationships around authority, identity, and territory that they encode). A full analysis of these recursive processes lies beyond the scope of this paper, but future scholars will surely be compelled to tackle this issue. The institutionalized political relationships around land that have linked smallholders to postcolonial states, and that have produced various forms of political order in most of rural Africa for most of the postcolonial era, are now under tremendous strain. As they crack and give way, new forms of politics will emerge around land. These processes can transform the basic structures of state-society relations in Africa.
